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Introduction
To exchange commodities, individuals require information about the commodities' makeup and the terms of exchanging them. Who would actually collect the information, the seller the buyer, both of them, or perhaps a third party? If the exchange encompasses heterogeneous units, would information be gathered on every unit or on a sample of units? For a multiple-attribute commodity, would information be gathered on all or only on some of them?
What is the maximizing level of accuracy of the information to be collected? When would it be produced? What are the terms of transfer from on 1 e transactor to the other? The cost of information in the perfectly competitive Walrasian world is zero. The parties know precisely the attribute levels and prices of all commodities, and property rights are well defined. The world is Pareto optimal then and the solutions of the problems posed are trivial. In the model adopted here information is costly to produce and transmit. I show under what circumstances would people form different kinds of agreements and different kinds of organizations to resolve the above problems.
Property rights over assets and over asset information
How does the economic ownership over exchanged commodities and over the information used to exchange them emerge and how is it divided? Economic ownership over a good, a forward-looking concept, is defined as the ability to enjoy it directly, or indirectly through exchange. With no information about a commodity, the commodity and its value are using it, but this measurement is too late to accommodate second thoughts about the transaction.
Measurement is costly, and the parties economize on these costs. This implies that measurement is subject to error, and that commodity specimens and their attributes will only be sampled. Both parties, then, face a trade-off between the accuracy of measurement and getting "burned," and they expect to occasionally get burned.
In many essential features the analysis of caveat emptor transactions also applies to auctions. It may superficially appear that in auctions the seller just sits back and waits for the highest bid to emerge. But if only one bidder shows up, he will bid at most the minimum price the seller sets. The seller, then, must conduct research to determine the optimizing minimum price and also alert would-be buyers that they might value the commodity. Finally, each participant must do research to decide how much to bid. So here too effort is duplicated.
Long-term relations
The organization of exchange under long-term relations is radically different from that under caveat emptor, and it induces a radical change in the measurements that the parties effect.
Using long-term relations, the seller makes certain explicit or implicit promises about the makeup of his commodity. Taking advantage of the promises, buyers refrain from measuring the commodity at purchase time. Instead, they engage in measuring when it is least costly, often as part of the act of consumption. If dissatisfied, they can punish the seller by withholding future purchases. Buyers, however, do not gain from the penalty he imposes on the seller, and thus moral hazard is absent here. I will return to this feature when discussing multiple enforcers.
To perform their function, long-term relations, usually accompanied by brand names, must be sufficiently valuable to induce buyers to risk paying for merchandise that they do not inspect. Long-term relations have to be developed and maintained. The more the seller could gain by breaking his promise the larger the required size of the relational investment. [Thus, for instance, the cost to the seller of the needed investment as well as of its maintenance is relatively modest for buyers who effect long streams of small purchases.]
Compared with caveat emptor, the buyer under long-term relations enforcement saves the cost of measuring at purchase time. Prominent here are attributes that are especially costly to measure at transaction time relative to measuring them later. For example, the commodity's durability and shelf life are usually expensive to measure at purchase time and are often measured cheaply with use. Thus, I predict that durability or of shelf life would not be significant attributes of commodities traded under caveat emptor or in auctions.
Enforcement by contract
In contractual exchange the stipulations sellers make are subject to enforcement by the state. The state, as a rule, does not participate in the contractual process. It obtains its information about the agreement from the contract when a dispute erupts. Contract stipulations, then, must be objectively measurable and verifiable. The lower the cost of measuring commodity attributes, the more attractive is exchanging them by contract. Attributes such as "beautiful," or "good tasting" require information, but are not measurable (or are extremely costly to measure), and thus we do not expect them to be stipulated in contracts. Verification of the stipulations constitutes duplication. As with long-term enforcement, the guaranteed can effect the verification when his cost of measuring the guaranteed attributes is low; for instance, while he uses the commodity rather than when it changes hands. On the other hand, "information" is more ephemeral and so is its standing in court. Such difficult-to-measure attributes, however, may be stipulated in long-term exchange agreements.
Agreements with multiple enforcers
I argue elsewhere (Barzel, 2002) An attractive feature of enforcement by long-term relations is that it does not give rise to moral hazard. Buyers take the merchandise on trust, and only later discover if it met the (implied) promised quality. If not satisfied, they can punish the seller, but since they would not get their money back, the actual moral hazard does not to yield them benefits.
The simultaneous use of long-term and contractual enforcement can exploit the fact that long-term relations are free of moral hazard, but at the same time use contracts to reduce the level needed of reputational capital. Considering the guarantee of the durability of appliances, it is actually partly contractual and partly subject to long-term relations. The contract covers the early portion of the life of an appliance, when the moral hazard problem is not serious. Long-term relations back the guarantee beyond that point; the seller does not compensate buyers when the appliance dies then. Therefore, buyers do not gain from being careless; they knows when they are to blame for carelessness, and would not punish the seller when poorly maintained appliances fail.
A producer whose product has been performing poorly presumably will attempt to reverse the trend. Whether or not he is successful, we expect him to strengthen the contractual guarantee. Since consumers' valuation of his reputation has declined, to induce them to buy his good he must contractually commit to compensate them more fully if the product proves faulty. 
Within-organization exchange
Thus far I attempted to determine what independent exchange parties who use various forms of agreement can accomplish. Seemingly, as long as the state diligently enforces contracts and provided that sellers' brand-name capital is adequate for the tasks at hand market exchange is effective. An implicit assumption underlying the discussion is that the exchange information is useful to the two transactors only. The information, however, may also be valuable to third parties. In what follows I focus on information transmitted across vertical production stages. The transmission of information by independent transactors becomes increasingly difficult as the number of production stages it has to traverse increases. Vertical integration may prove useful for overcoming this difficulty.
Typically, the producers within integrated firms are employed for wages. Employees are distinguished by that they are not induced to exploit certain capture opportunities that independent workers would exploit, and their employers can position them so that they become easier to observe. I discuss each in turn.
The employment relationship
Employees employed for wages are not the residual claimants to their operation. Rather, they follow their employer's instructions about what to produce and to whom to transmit their
output. An employer who employs two vertically related producers is forming a vertically integrated operation. Vertical integration is useful where measuring the output the upstream producer transmits to the downstream one is difficult. It tends to relieve the excessive measurement that independent producers would have engaged in. It is difficult to measure the output of these producers, but as they are paid by the hour and not by the piece, they gain little from producing low quality output. The problems of not producing low quality output and of the potential dispute in transmitting it largely disappear. The employer, of course, has to supervise employees to ensure that they exert themselves and produce the right kind of output.
An independent upstream producer would fear losses if the variability of the product he produces is high and his buyers can pick and choose the specimens they want. (Barzel, 1982) . This is not an issue with an employed producer. We expect him, then, to produce specimens are of higher average quality, but subject to higher variability then what he would produce as an independent operator. That suits the employer who is concerned more with measuring the mean, which is relatively cheap, then with measuring the variance, which is relatively expensive. In his turn, the downstream producer, also an employee, would gain less from actions such as picking and choosing than if he was an independent worker.
The attributes that contracts stipulate must be measurable and verifiable. Focusing on the latter, the literature often divides instances into those that are, and those that are not verifiable.
An action that appears as not verifiable, however, is not necessarily inherently so. Rather, it seems that independent producers are not keen to share with others some of the measurements that they generate, and they deliberately make such information difficult to observe and to verify. Non-verifiability in this case is not inherent and it depends on the choice of action by the information producer. The information may become verifiable under other organizational arrangements, especially when the workers generating the data are employees.
Coase aptly characterizes wage employment as a master-servant relationship. A person who becomes an employee cedes to the employer the right to instruct him what to do.
Consider in this light the following scenario. An independent upstream producer who produces such information takes steps to keep it away from others. Suppose that an employerentrepreneur forms an organization that employs that producer as an employee. The employer who controls the working space can position his employee to make his actions relatively easy to observe. The employer, then, can discern whether or not the employee is making the desired level of effort. Under these conditions the employer can acquire and transmit the uncontaminated information to those for whom it is useful. This factor, then, contributes to the theory of vertical integration.
Expanding the scope of vertical integration
Vertical integration encompasses two closely related phenomena that are usually not considered to be part of it. One is that in large markets individual workers often perform the same string of vertical tasks as the others do rather than each specializing in performing just one. The other is that consumers purchase many not fully finished commodities, and then perform the finishing tasks. What constitutes a production "stage?" Implicit is the notion that a stage is what a typical worker in a large market specializes in. This response, however, begs the question. I suggests that measurement cost considerations may clarify the concepts of a production stage and of the degree of specializing.
The extent of the market:
A necessary but not a sufficient condition for specializing "The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market" is one of Adam Smith's most famous pronouncements. It implies that a worker who performs more than one of the production stages must be operating in a small market. Conversely, given the assertion, we expect specialized workers each to perform one of the constituent operations in large markets. I contend that Smith's "extent of the market" is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for full specializing. Indeed, the actual degree of specializing seldom exploits fully the specializing opportunities that markets afford.
I hypothesize that the costliness of measuring the intermediate product that would have emerged from a greater degree of specializing is the reason for the incomplete specializing. In Smith's pin making illustration the metal is first drawn, then straightened, then cut, and so forth. His discussion implies that in large markets specialized workers perform each of the operations. Consider the product of the metal drawing operation process. The delineation of that product seems quite clear. The straightener, then, knows what he is paying for. Focusing on straightening, this operation seemingly could be divided among, say, three specialists. One would start the operation, one would perform the middle part and the third would complete it.
Why did Smith not observe three sub-specialists divide the task among them in large markets?
My answer is that the product the middle worker in the straightening trio was to receive is difficult to delineate. If so, what would he be paying for? Given the difficulty, the first member of the trio may "shirk" in the quality of the product he delivers without being easily caught. But then the transaction between the first and second straightener is difficult to execute, (and similarly that between the second and the third methods induced by a change in input costs or an increase in product price. In such cases we expect more production stages to emerge and the degree of specializing to increase both among independent workers and within firms.
Market specializing and home production.
Consumers' purchase of not quite fully "finished" goods and performing at home the final production stages is another neglected form of incomplete specializing. Two examples are the purchase of items that need assembly and the purchase of clothing that shrink after being washed and thus in general will not fit well. Sellers or other specialists sometimes, but not routinely, provide the assembly and the preshrinking services. Other time buyers have to fend for themselves.
As in the previous case, I hypothesize that the sale of the not fully finished products (or services) is expected to occur when measuring them is easier than of the more finished products. We expect that as measuring the finished commodities becomes cheaper, more of them will be sold in the finished form. 
Transmitting information across transactors
Vertically integrated organizations are well suited for transmitting information across transactors. In general, guarantees are attractive because, as stated, they relieve buyers from measuring their purchases at the time of the transaction. A difficulty is encountered, however, when the guarantor is separated from the guaranteed by additional links in the production process. I commence with a case where the separation is not problematic.
Consider guaranteed garments. A dissatisfied consumer will return the garment to the retailer who, for all she is concerned, is responsible for it. The retailer, however, is likely to demand a refund from the wholesaler who in turn may get the manufacturer to pay him back.
When the links in this chain function smoothly, it transpires that it is the manufacturer who actually guaranteed the garment to the consumer, while the intermediaries remained "neutral."
Consumers would have made a certain number of guarantee claims had they bought the garments directly from the manufacturer. Seemingly, the intermediaries here would not gain from inducing guarantee claims over and above those buyers would have made directly. The manufacturer, then, does not fear that the intermediaries would take a ride on the guarantee to consumers. This conclusion seems to apply to most intermediation by wholesalers and retailers, but not to the general case. By and large, intermediate producers may be able to take a ride at the guarantor's expense. This, for instance, seems to be the case when the intermediaries are producers or shippers who alter the product that the upstream producer ships downstream. I proceed with the illustration of intermediation by shippers. Suppose that the following cost conditions hold. First, freshness is easy to inspect when B prepares the vegetables for shipment and when they are unpacked at the supermarket.
Second, inspecting the vegetables while in transit is expensive when the most economical packaging method is used. Third, shippers' costs are lower when they skimp on maintaining freshness. Suppose also that B used the low-cost packaging method and guaranteed the produce to E and that shippers C and D were operating independently. Under these conditions, C and D would have skimped on maintaining freshness and then blame the loss of freshness on the other. Therefore, freshness would not have been adequately maintained. One way for retaining freshness is to use a more transparent and a higher total cost packaging method, and trade by caveat emptor. This arrangement would entail three caveat emptor transactions where successive buyers pay only after evaluating the freshness of the produce.
Agreements to transmit information enforceable by the courts
These repeated measurements may be avoided, however, by taking advantage of vertical integration. The scope of the integration, however, depends on whether the guarantee is by contract or by reputation. Consider the contractual guarantee first. Suppose that freshness can be measured, say, by bacteria count. B would be willing to contractually guarantee freshness to E if C and D merge, and, in addition, commit to use shipping methods that help preserve freshness. C+D is now the residual claimant to the degree of freshness that proper shipping methods create, and is willing to be held responsible for maintaining the freshness of the produce that passes through his organization. C+D knows that it can deliver because it employs the producers for wages, and will simply instruct its employees to take the necessary steps to maintain freshness. Wage employees' inclination to alter the guaranteed attribute is not strong. 4 C and D's merger allows B to leapfrog both and contractually guarantee freshness to E. 5 Note that even though the level of integration is higher here, the non-contractual component of the operations is actually lowered.
Which production stages will the integration encompass? Had the integration only conferred benefits, it would presumably encompass all stages. But turning profit oriented independent centers into more bureaucratic organizations is expensive.
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If in a k stages operation the operator of stage 1 guarantees his product to the stage k operator, we expect the integration to cover only those stages between 2 and k-1 that would significantly benefit from taking a ride on the guarantee to be included in the integrated organization. We expect an operator of an interior stage who would not gain from exploiting the guarantee to operate independently as an outside contractor to the vertically integrated operation; i.e. e., to engage in outsourcing. 7 For instance, suppose that k is a final consumer and k-1 is a retailer. If the retailer does not gain from taking a ride on the guarantee, he would not be included in the integrated operation and the integration would encompass at most stages 2 to k-2.
The advantage of integration increases with the number of vertical steps in production because the opportunities for taking a ride on guarantees expand then. When the cost of organizing vertical relations falls, we expect production to become more specialized. And when the gains from specializing increase, we expect that production will become more integrated.
Agreements to transmit information not enforceable by the courts
4 Arrow (1975) is perhaps the first to suggest that vertical integration is a method for transmitting information. However, he does not consider the case where the production of information consumes resources. 5 Freshness then is broken into two distinct components. Error in measuring these must be moderate for the arrangement to work. 6 This reason, I think, conforms with Coase's (1937) rationale of the limits on firm size. 7 Problems may remain even when there is only one intermediary between the guarantor and guaranteed.
The cost of measuring and appropriately verifying the levels of some transaction attributes may be too high to be used in court. Contracts are not useful for preserving the measurements of such attributes. Transactors who directly deal with each other may preserve such measurements by using long-term relations. As indicated, however, guarantees become less effective when intermediate transactors between the guarantor and the guaranteed can gain from taking a ride on it. Vertical integration may prove useful here too.
Here too we ask how extensive would vertical integration be? Consider the freshness of bread, and suppose that all the assumption regarding vegetables apply to bread except that bread freshness is very difficult to measure and it is guaranteed by brand name instead.
Independent shippers, however, may take a ride on the guarantee the baker makes to the retailer. Since sequences of long-term relations seem difficult to manage, we expect that either the baker or the retailer will integrate with the shippers, and the employed shippers will be instructed to take the steps necessary to maintain freshness. The level of integration here is one step more inclusive than when the guarantee is contractual.
Capture of quasi rent
I just argued that the costliness of measuring exchange entities may lead to vertical integration. How does this view relate to the leading theory of vertical integration-the prevention of the capture of specialized assets' quasi rent (Williamson, 1975, Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) ? The situations that the literature considers to be subject to quasi-rent capture seem too restricted and vertical integration seems not the only methods of reducing the deadweight losses from capture.
The income that assets generate in their specialized use is, to belabor the obvious, higher than the income they generate elsewhere. The ability to generate quasi rents, however, is not confined to what is usually tagged as specialized assets. For example employees' value to their employers, as a rule, exceeds their wages. At the same time, their reservation wage tends to be less than their actual wage. The discrepancy between the maximum their employers would pay and their reservation wage constitutes quasi rent that could be captured. [As another example, a shopper who has already entered a store is now earning a quasi rent for not having to travel to the store, thus the practice of "bait and switch." Similarly, the seller's profit margin is also a quasi rent.]
What is the relationship between the capture notion and the economic property rights?
When measurement is costless there is no barrier to write and enforce complete contracts. The existence of such contracts means that ownership is well defined. The rents of specialized assets (or of anything else) will not be captured then.
Measurement, however, is costly. Transactors, therefore, do not know for sure what they can achieve when exchanging with each other. Their economic rights are not well defined, then, and they spend resources to capture what they can. Each expects to derive some net gain from the assets. Rights eventually become well defined, but at a resource cost. This behavior characterizes any dispute since disputes consist of the competition (capture attempt) between the parties for the difference in valuation (quasi rent) of the disputed entity.
Capture opportunities seemingly exist everywhere under costly measurement. It is highly plausible, however, that people take action to avoid the associated resource expenditures.
Converting idiosyncratic situations into standardized ones is one method of avoiding disputes.
Standardization reduces quasi rents, and with that, the incentive for capture. The benefits that standards generate have to be weighed against the cost of the infrastructure for their implementation (and perhaps, the loss from reduced diversity).
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The use of long-term relations also sidesteps the quasi-rent capture. These seem to be especially effective when transactors deal directly with each other because forming long-term relations is relatively easy then. Thus vendors acquire a reputation for not engaging in bait and switch, employees for faithfulness and employers for fairness. Similarly, firms may acquire reputation of not engaging in capture. Considering, for instance, the relationship between the small town newspaper and printing plant, one of the two or both may become part of reputable chains that find it in their interest to honor their agreements.
Long-term relations, however, may be too expensive to form or to maintain. When, for instance, individuals replace clans, thus reducing the durability of relationships, we expect such costs to increase. As discussed earlier, long-term relations also become more difficult to form the farther removed from each other, in terms of the chains of transactions, transactors are. We expect vertical integration, which is another substitute to idiosyncratic trade, to become more common then. Note that the rent capture is averted only if the integration is done ahead of time.
I just argued that the notion of specific assets is less general than that of measurement costs. In addition, the former is also less operational. The easier are the measurement and the verification of contract stipulations, the more readily can the contract be enforced. Thus it is predicted that as the costs of measurement and of verification decline, transactors will use contracts more often and engage in vertical integration less often. Such a proposition is unlikely to emerge from the concept of specialized assets.
Conclusions
To exchange, the seller requires the same commodity information the buyer wants. In caveat emptor transactions, the two can rely only on their own measurements prior to the exchange even if measurement is very costly then. Forming long-term relations allows the buyer to measure the purchased commodity at consumption. But to be effective, the value of the reputational investment has to be larger than what the seller may gain by not keeping the quality promise. Contractual guarantees shift the burden to the state, but require objective and verifiable measurements of the guaranteed attributes. Most exchange agreements combine the two forms to benefit from the comparative advantage of each. The use of this combination often significantly reduces the deadweight losses from moral hazard.
Finally, vertical integration between upstream and downstream producers reduce the cost of measuring the exchanged commodities because the employed workers gain little from manipulating the commodities they exchange and the information about them. Vertical integration is especially attractive when upstream producers wish to guarantee their products across downstream transactors, who, when independent, would have gained from taking a ride on the guarantee. Long-term relations are difficult to implement then, and operating within organization seems effective in handling the transmission of the commodity without "contamination" at the intermediate steps.
The capture of quasi rent from specialized assets is just another case of difficult to measure entities. The notion of measurement cost is more general than that of specific assets. It is also more operational.
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